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SPEECH AND SILENCE IN CICERO’S FINAL DAYS 
 
 
Abstract: Composed in spring of 46 BC, Cicero’s Brutus emphasizes oratorical silence, in stark 
contrast with the prominence of the speech act found in the Pro Marcello and first Philippic. Yet 
in the face of those difficult times and amidst the silence that such times engender, Cicero ironically 
finds his voice. This paper will demonstrate Cicero’s acute awareness, in his final days, of the need 
to employ his rediscovered voice in light of eloquence’s changed role in Rome’s new political 
climate. 
 
 
n the Brutus Cicero grapples with both personal and political conflicts. A 
survivor in the republic’s final hours, he considers lucky those who, like the 
elder Hortensius, died before seeing the massacre at Pharsalus. He goes so far 
as to claim that, unlike Hortensius, those orators who live have had their voices 
extinguished not by his own death, but by that of the republic.1 Yet his friends 
Atticus and Brutus, who interrupt his silent and anxious otium, seek to restore his 
voice by leading him toward the processes of remembering and recounting.2 
Cicero’s treatise comes at a pivotal moment when the republic suffers from a 
deserted forum, yet, within the treatise, memory of a more stable, secure past is 
renewed and revived. Cicero both uses his voice to remember and invokes a time 
when eloquence had a significant role in the republic. In addition, the conclusion 
of the Brutus offers the reader a glimpse of the need to protect eloquence, an 
aspect of rhetoric traditionally employed for intervening in and modifying 
political reality. But here, Cicero advances the notion of a life withdrawn from 
political reality, a mode of living entirely “pure,” far from the contamination of 
one who would employ speech in the service of the troubled state (Brut. 330): 
 
1 Brut. 328–9. 
2 I have argued elsewhere (Marchese (2011) 22–30) that reciprocity and memory animate the 
conversation among Cicero, Brutus and Atticus, transforming the social practice of eloquence into 
a norm for the future. 
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Nos autem, Brute, … domi teneamus eam saeptam liberali custodia, 
et hos ignotos atque impudentes procos repudiemus tueamurque ut 
adultam virginem caste et ab amatorum impetu quantum possumus 
prohibeamus. 
 
But, Brutus, let us keep her (Eloquence) home, penned up inside 
with a liberal guard, and let us scold these worthless and impertinent 
suitors, and let us watch over her, as a grown up virgin, chastely, and 
let us, to the utmost of our ability, keep her back from the onslaught 
of suitors.3 
 
Here eloquence is separated from the public, an idea that would become a topos 
of the res publica litterarum.4 Ironically, the silence of Eloquence, portrayed here as 
a guarded virgin, will prove to be short lived, since, with the return of Caesar to 
Rome, the season of speech making will soon reopen. 
 
Dicere as an Expression of Thanks in the Pro Marcello 
After Caesar’s return, Cicero has an opportunity to step back into the 
oratorical ring in a meaningful way. The occasion occurs in a session of the 
Senate in which Caesar asks the senators to give their opinion on a decision that 
has already been made, the recall of Marcellus, Caesar’s most bitter political 
adversary, who was then in voluntary exile on Lesbos. Cicero takes up the subject 
of his return to the bar in the opening words of Pro Marcello (1):5 
 
Diuturni silenti, patres conscripti, quo eram his temporibus usus … 
finem hodiernus dies attulit, idemque initium quae vellem quaeque 
sentirem, meo pristino more dicendi. Tantam enim 
mansuetudinem, tam inusitatam inauditamque clementiam, tantum 
in summa potestate rerum omnium modum, tam denique 
3 All translations are those of Hanchey, Hunt, and Smith. 
4 Cf. Stroup (2003) 140, who views Brutus as the work in which Cicero foreshadows how 
Roman eloquence can function in a world dominated by the power of a single individual, namely in 
book form. The personification of eloquence as an adult “virgo” reveals Cicero’s strategy of 
transferring the powers of oratory from speech to writing. 
5 On the different interpretations of the oration it is always useful to consult the survey of 
Paladini (1973); for the reconstruction of the context of the oration, cf. Fiocchi (1990). For a 
comprehensive study of the Caesarian orations, cf. Gasti (1997). 
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incredibilem sapientiam ac paene divinam tacitus praeterire nullo 
modo possum. 
 
This day, conscript fathers … has brought an end to the long silence 
that I have kept in these stormy times. That same day has brought a 
beginning, too, of my speaking in the way I used to speak when I 
expressed what I wished and what I felt. For I cannot by any means 
pass over in silence such great gentility, such unusual and unheard of 
clemency, such temperance in the wielding of the utmost power 
over everything, and finally such unbelievable, almost divine, 
wisdom. 
 
Though his reasons for the diuturnum silentium are not expressly stated, Cicero 
may have had some trepidation about being too visible, since the social and 
political climate was characterized by anguish and doubt. That anguish derived 
from the fact that the city was increasingly being abandoned, suggesting an 
uncertain future. There was also pained regret of those who survived the deaths 
of so many, as well as grief, both of which emotions were felt throughout the 
Senate.6 Thus, Cicero was hesitant to speak, as the wounds of civil war had not 
yet begun to heal. 
Soon, however, Cicero returned to his former practice, embracing the 
opportunity to speak for Marcellus. His speech consists of a gratiarum actio, 
whereby he thanks Caesar for wielding power gently. In doing so, Cicero holds to 
the established practice of appeasing a dictator to tamp down any possibility of 
violent behavior. Held back from “doing things” with words,7 Cicero nevertheless 
can, through public expression of gratitude, affirm Caesar’s clementia. Inasmuch 
as Caesar’s discretion has exceeded the expectations of all, it cries out for public 
recognition, and Cicero cannot remain silent. On this momentous occasion, 
Cicero renews a sense of continuity with the past (Marc. 2): 
 
M. enim Marcello vobis, patres conscripti, reique publicae reddito, 
non illius solum, sed etiam meam vocem et auctoritatem vobis et rei 
publicae conservatam ac restitutam puto…. Ergo et mihi meae 
pristinae vitae consuetudinem, C. Caesar, interclusam aperuisti et 
6 Further on pudor and verecundia, cf. Kaster (2005) and Thomas (2006).  
7 I refer to Austin’s (1962) definition of the performative function of language. 
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his omnibus ad bene de re publica sperandum quasi signum aliquod 
sustulisti. 
 
Since Marcus Marcellus has been given back to you, conscript 
fathers, and to the republic, I think that not only this man’s authority 
and voice but my own, as well, have been preserved and restored 
both to you and the state…. Accordingly, Caius Caesar, you have 
opened to me afresh my former lifestyle, hitherto hindered, raising 
me up to all as a sign of good hope for the whole state. 
 
Marcellus’ pardon represents something quite radical: the restitution of the voice 
and the authority of Cicero himself. That voice now finds itself again publicly 
active because Caesar has demonstrated justice in restoring the vanquished, even 
those who had opposed him. Up to this moment, dolor and verecundia prevented 
Cicero from making public use of speech because Marcellus, represented as a 
partner in Cicero’s actions and beliefs, was still far away and out of favor. Now, 
Cicero can rediscover his public voice (1f.) 
Though his speech is an expression of thanks, Cicero is aware that even so it 
could give rise to misunderstanding (Marc. 12): 
 
Et ceteros quidem omnis victores bellorum civilium iam antea 
aequitate et misericordia viceras: hodierno vero die te ipsum vicisti. 
Vereor ut hoc, quod dicam, perinde intellegi possit auditu atque ipse 
cogitans sentio: ipsam victoriam vicisse videris, cum ea quae erant 
adepta victis remisisti. 
 
And indeed, you had outstripped all the rest of the victors in the civil 
wars already in terms of your fairness and mercy. But today you have 
even outstripped yourself. I fear that the kind of thing I am now 
stating cannot be understood aurally, at least in terms of how fully as 
I myself feel it when I ponder it; you seem to me to have conquered 
victory itself, since you have given back to the conquered those 
things that victory had taken from them.  
 
The speech-act (dicere) of Cicero tracks Caesar’s growth from personal interest 
toward the common good. Cicero uses hyperbole to express his view of the 
reconciliation between victor and vanquished that comes to the fore in his 
outline of Caesar’s beneficentia (Marc. 19): 
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Cetera cum tua recordabere, etsi persaepe virtuti, tamen plerumque 
felicitati tuae gratulabere: de nobis, quos in re publica tecum simul 
esse voluisti, quotiens cogitabis, totiens de maximis tuis beneficiis, 
totiens de incredibili liberalitate, totiens de singulari sapientia 
cogitabis …ut haec a virtute donata, cetera a fortuna commodata 
esse videantur. 
 
As often as you think about us, whom you have wanted to share with 
you in the republic, just so often you will consider your own great 
beneficence, your own remarkable generosity, your own stellar 
wisdom … While other qualities seem to have been furnished by 
fortune, these appear to have been granted by virtue.  
 
Cicero interprets Caesar’s beneficentia as a demonstration of his virtus, thereby 
assigning him the role of benefactor, restorer of dignity to the vanquished.8 Such 
restoration is a signal act of virtue for it encompasses the reintegration of the 
defeated within the body of the state. Cicero’s assignment of such a role to Caesar 
provides the dictator with an ethical model, thereby establishing rules of conduct 
derived from the code of beneficium, a practice employed in the Roman republic 
for centuries to manage the relationships of inequality with conquered peoples. 
The winner’s generosity could be demonstrated by his willingness to enter upon 
an accord, whereby the request for lenience is not demanded by the conquered 
party, but rather is established by the judgment of the victor.  
By pronouncing Caesar’s beneficia to be outstanding, Cicero shows how the 
dictator has reintegrated the conquered into the body of the state. These beneficia 
allow the dictator to garner the most authentic and longest lasting glory, dignitas 
in magnitudine animi et consili (Marc. 19). Cicero thereby offers Caesar an 
opportunity to display his new nature in a way which will preserve the memory of 
his res gestae.  
Significantly, Cicero has achieved all this through the newfound “voice” that 
has come to him only after a long silence (Marc . 33): 
 
Sed ut, unde est orsa, in eodem terminetur oratio, maximas tibi 
omnes gratias agimus, C. Caesar, maiores etiam habemus. Nam 
8 Cf. Marchese (2008) 129–45. 
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omnes idem sentiunt … Nam laetari omnes non ut de unius, sed ut 
de omnium salute sentio. 
 
But let my speech end in the same place as it began: we all, Caius 
Caesar, offer you the greatest thanks, and we hold back even greater 
thanks. For all men feel the same thing, … and I sense that everyone 
is taking joy not only about the safety of a single man but in the 
common safety of all. 
 
Cicero responds gratefully to the salvation not merely of an individual but of the 
entire civic body, reassembled after a long and violent conflict. Cicero’s gratitude 
thus defends his benefactor’s life, providing a response to Caesar, the winner who 
wished to preserve the former republic. This fresh voice of the orator now 
assumes the task of restructuring relations between Caesar and the Senate. Yet by 
praising Caesar (dicere laudes), Cicero treads what will prove to be a slippery 
slope for Roman eloquence, that of the exhortation of the powerful.9  
This use for speech notwithstanding, Cicero is nevertheless beset with the 
worry that oratorical eloquence cannot recover its performative function (i.e., its 
capacity to “do things”).10 That eloquence, we saw earlier, is a “maiden come of 
age” (adulta virgo), who takes her tutelage both from Cicero and Brutus in the 
treatise of 46 BC. Eloquence now belongs to the provinence of philosophical 
discourse, as will be clear in Cicero’s last work, the de Officiis. Yet, as it turns out, 
eloquence will transcend that setting, for she will serve Cicero well in his first 
speech against Mark Antony. 
 
Dicere as Testimony in the First Philippic 
Cicero composed his first Philippic in a context requiring rhetorical force.11 In 
his speech of 2 September 44 BC, Cicero addressed senators gathered in the 
Temple of Concord in the forum.12 One day earlier Antony had called a 
preliminary meeting to gain approval for ritual ceremonies in memory of Caesar. 
Cicero, not yet having returned to Rome, had not participated in the session, but 
9 On these aspects of the speech Connolly (2011) has recently offered a convincing 
interpretation. 
10 See Austin, cited in n. 7 above. 
11 For a discussion of the rhetorical characteristics of the oration, see Manuwald (2004). 
12 For an accurate reconstruction of the historical context of the oration, cf. Ramsey (2003) 1–
10; also Frisch (1946). 
 
                                                          
SPEECH AND SILENCE 83 
sent his regrets to Antony. Yet Antony’s reaction was hostile, as he interpreted 
Cicero’s absence as a provocation. He thus undertook the extreme measure of 
forcing the senators into a deliberative session.  
The form and structure of Cicero’s speech appear to be strongly influenced by 
this context: his oratorical style is deliberative, as he intervenes in a political 
debate, though in fact he is treating what is essentially a personal question.13 At 
the speech’s opening, Cicero indicates that he will state his motivation directly 
(Phil. 1.1): 
 
Antequam de re publica, patres conscripti, dicam ea quae dicenda 
hoc tempore arbitror, exponam vobis breviter consilium et 
profectionis et reversionis meae. 
 
Before, conscript fathers, I should say these things about the 
republic that I think at this time must be said, I will briefly set forth 
to you the reason for my departure and for my return. 
 
Here Cicero offers a kind of self-definition that unequivocally communicates the 
pressing need for him to say (dicere) the things that need to be said (dicenda) 
regarding the management of the state (de re publica); he indicates that 
circumstances require such intervention (hoc tempore). Yet he will also explain 
that his absence from the prior meeting was engendered by his excursion from 
Rome, which had involved an unexpected deviation in itinerary. Before speaking, 
Cicero will explain (exponam) the facts that establish his own credibility, an 
important feature inasmuch as he now inserts his voice into the political debate. 
This expositio also explains the unexpected direction of his public life in the 
aftermath of Caesar’s assassination. 
In June everything had changed (mutata omnia, Phil. 1.6). The consuls had 
shown an ambiguous attitude toward the management of power, and Cicero had 
thus decided to leave Rome to return the following year, in the hope that a new 
beginning could restore dignity to the Senate’s authority. At first, Cicero notes,14 
Antony and Dolabella seemed to return strength to the established institutions 
and to repress attempts to subvert order. Yet, as he headed south, important news 
came to Cicero at Leucopetra, where some of the townsfolk of Rhegium came to 
13 Ramsey (2003) 83. 
14 Cicero Phil. 1.2 and esp. 1.5. 
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greet him (he also heard of it later from Brutus, who explained things in person to 
Cicero at Velia). The people of Rhegium informed Cicero that the political 
climate was changing and that negotiation had commenced between Antony and 
Caesar’s killers. Brutus told him of the strong stance taken by Caesar’s supporter, 
Lucius Cornelius Piso, in the Senate on August 1, a statement designed to oppose 
any attempt to manipulate Caesar’s true intentions. That position, however, 
isolated Piso from the greater part of the Senate; more importantly, Piso’s 
intervention compelled Cicero to return hurriedly (Phil. 1.10): 
 
Hunc igitur ut sequerer properavi quem praesentes non sunt secuti, 
non ut proficerem aliquid (nec enim sperabam id nec praestare 
poteram), sed ut, si quid mihi humanitus accidisset (multa autem 
impendere videntur praeter naturam etiam praeterque fatum), 
huius tamen diei vocem testem rei publicae relinquerem meae 
perpetuae erga se voluntatis. 
 
Therefore, I hastened to support him whom those present had not. I 
did not do this to accomplish something (for I neither was hoping 
for that nor could I offer that), but so that, if that which happens to 
all men (death) should happen to befall me—in fact many things 
seemed to be threatening me beyond what was normal (and even 
beyond fate!)—nevertheless I might leave my testimony on this day 
as a witness to the republic of my perpetual goodwill toward it. 
 
Cicero would have wished to offer his testimony to a colleague who courageously 
defended the institutions of the republic. In doing so, the voice of the orator 
could express support for the community’s functional integrity. This 
commitment to the commonwealth could have complemented that of Piso, 
Caesar’s adjutant and the father of his wife, Calpurnia. Though he had not shown 
much sympathy for Piso in the past, Cicero reveals his personal willingness to 
join him in loyal support of the state and to renew the watchfulness (vigilia) that 
he had shown in the days following the death of Caesar.  
Cicero’s rhetorical strategy distinctively features a redefinition of his ethical 
persona: he assumes the role of a witness, as his words meant to reveal that 
freedom has not yet been eradicated. On the agenda of the preliminary meeting 
called by Antony on September 1 there had been a proposal of supplications for 
the slain dictator; accordingly, he had decided not to attend the meeting, an 
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action, we saw earlier, angrily criticized by Antony. Though he afterward returned 
to put his voice to good use, during the vote on supplications Cicero had chosen 
the path of absence and silence in a decisive moment.  
The justification he offers in the first Philippic for his decision minimizes its 
importance: it was not, Cicero suggests, an issue vital to the state, and was 
certainly not comparable, for example, to the presence of Hannibal at the gates, 
or the peace negotiations with Pyrrhus. Cicero thus reduces the issue of 
supplication to private interest, not that of the community.15 His choice not to 
attend, then, was in accord with the custom of the senatorial sessions, and was 
justified, on a personal level, by the notice that he had sent to Antony. Cicero’s 
absence, if an autonomous gesture, did not break with recognized convention; 
conversely, Antony’s response is a wrathful iniuria, an act of aggression against a 
political ally. 
Symbolically, Cicero’s choice not to attend the meeting and not to speak 
during the vote about the ceremonies honoring the dictator can be seen as highly 
effective on the performative level. Cicero, in fact, depicts such inaction as merely 
a part of the established protocol. Through his apology, he seeks to preserve his 
private relationship with Antony. In response to the reaction of the consul, 
Cicero can create a contrast between the practical effect of his missing the 
meeting and the hypothetical scenario of his participation (Phil. 1.13): 
 
An me censetis, patres conscripti, quod vos invite secuti estis, 
decreturum fuisse, ut parentalia cum supplicationibus miscerentur, 
ut inexpiabiles religiones in rem publicam inducerentur, ut 
decernerentur supplicationes mortuo?  
 
But can it be that you think that I, conscript fathers, would have 
voted for a thing that you agreed to unwillingly, that the honors 
accorded to deceased parents be blended with divine supplications, 
that inexpiable religious observances be brought into the republic, 
that supplications be decreed for a dead man? 
 
If Cicero had participated in the resolution, the vote would not have turned out 
in Antony’s favor, and he would only have taken the floor to remind the Senate 
how risky a proposition it was for the Roman people to mingle the cult of the 
15 Phil. 1.12. 
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dead with the religion of the immortal gods. His position would not have been 
favorable, and his voice would have been raised chiefly to recall the divide 
between the deceased dictator and Brutus who liberated Rome from the 
domination of a king, pointing out that such honor was better preserved for those 
who were benefactors of the city.  
If, therefore, Cicero chose silence and absence because he recognized in them 
a high performative value, it is also clear that the attendance and speech making 
of the Senate was not successful in allaying dissension, since the Senate rendered 
its decision unwillingly. In the current situation, senators no longer “do” the 
things they say, but rather have succumbed to acts that destabilize their hitherto 
commonly accepted authority. 
In this context, Cicero asks whether it is still possible to speak (dicere) to solve 
problems (Phil. 1.14). Evidently not, since the Roman people seem to accept 
decisions of which they do not approve while the Senate for its part now distorts 
the procedural and political prerogatives of its role. Speaking (dicere) is only 
possible for those who have not debased its function and purpose, by choosing 
the opposite strategy of silence and absence (Phil. 1.14):  
 
Mihi vero licet et semper licebit dignitatem tueri, mortem 
contemnere. Potestas modo veniendi in hunc locum sit: dicendi 
periculum non recuso. Atque utinam, patres conscripti, Kalendis 
Sextilibus adesse potuissem: … Non modo voce nemo L. Pisoni 
consularis, sed ne vultu quidem assensus est.  
 
Yet it is right, and always will be, that I watch closely my dignity and 
despise death. Provided only I have the power to come into this 
place, I recuse not the danger of declaration. And would that, 
conscript fathers, I had been able to be present on the Kalends of 
Sextilis! … No one of consular rank assented to Lucius Piso, 
whether with words or even by mere expression. 
 
In a political dynamic as inconsistent and dysfunctional as the one under which 
the city is living after Caesar’s murder, it seems especially necessary for Cicero to 
preserve the power of intervention and the action of speaking in isolation from 
the corrupt circumstances in which he finds himself. Those circumstances offer, 
as the only way out of the present situation, the subjugation of the common will 
to the privilege of a single individual. Yet Cicero demonstrates here that he has 
 
SPEECH AND SILENCE 87 
devised a preventative treatment, as it were, the one with which he closes Brutus: 
he exhorts himself and his (ideal) successor in rhetoric “to keep eloquence 
home,” as if she were a mature virgin (adulta virgo) who should preserve chastity 
as her primary feature (330).  
Now the central feature of Cicero’s rhetorical strategy emerges more clearly: 
speech can continue to function as it hitherto had only if it is distanced from 
contamination, specifically the subjection of Roman institutions to the will of a 
single person. Cicero takes up this idea in a context characterized by the abuse of 
the deliberative speech act: he shows his preference for silence instead of words, 
absence instead of presence. The ability to change the situation and to guide 
decisions is nullified, although the possibility of a good use of language, for 
building solidarity and rendering testimony, abides. His voice is employed to 
guard the dignity of Roman institutions and to express contempt for personal 
risk, even death. Having maintained his proper sense of self in relation to political 
institutions and preserved his integrity amidst the current disorder, Cicero now 
exercises his right to choose whether or not to attend the senatorial meeting. 
Whether he enters or not, his choice is dependent upon the action appropriate to 
the situation and the role in which he finds himself.  
For Cicero, the recovery of this autonomy requires the full acceptance of 
physical vulnerability to which public speech sometimes leads. Speaking has 
always had the power to produce results, but in the present circumstances, it can 
also expose Cicero to violence. Further, if a speech act cannot always effect 
change, it can at least express solidarity, and thus, in effect, put dignity on display. 
In this regard, the lack of support from the other senators in the arguments of 
Piso is an affront, as it even manifests the corruption of the speech act as much as 
does silence itself. 
Cicero notes that no one indicated agreement with Piso, even by expressions 
of face or gesture.16 Additionally, there was no one who, from the position of 
consular authority, lifted his voice to support Piso. By its silence the Senate robs 
itself of its capacity of genuine communication, thereby “deliberating” in a 
manner contrary to its own will.  
In this context, Cicero makes an appeal to the Senate to recover its autonomy: 
Quae, malum, est ista voluntaria servitus? Fuerit quaedam necessaria … Alia causa est 
16 The distinction between the level of referential content and how it is conveyed belongs to the 
pragmatic aspects of human communication, for which cf. Watzlawick et al. (1967). 
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eorum, quorum silentio ignosco, alia eorum, quorum vocem requiro (Oh the 
wickedness! What is that willingness to capitulate to slavery? Of course, a certain 
type of capitulation might have been necessary…. Yet the cause of those whose 
silence I pardon is quite different from that of them whose speaking out I require, 
Phil. 1.15). The Senate’s silence is proof of its transformation from forced 
enslavement to voluntary servitude. The argument of the orator is that slavery 
can be necessary for survival, but that the real damage is done by capitulation to 
the loss of freedom. Although it might happen to anyone with a weak character to 
subordinate his personal inclinations to another’s will, this particular 
transformation is widespread and seems to have affected everyone.  
Accordingly, Cicero asserts that refusing to speak on behalf of others is a 
violation of authentic dignity, especially if that silence is borne not only out of fear 
but from the pressure of selfish or utilitarian motives. To interpret this general 
condition Cicero has recourse to the category of turpe, the systematic violation of 
honor and decency, as the discussion contained in his contemporary work de 
Officiis teaches.17 With regard to the theme of decorum, Cicero offers a lengthy but 
interesting exposition in his de Officiis, useful to our interpretation of Philippic 1 
(Off. 1.110–13). The discussion centers on Cicero’s summary of the personae 
that affect and reflect an individual’s unique character. He emphasizes that an 
individual, while he should not strive against nature in general, in order to achieve 
the balance of decorum must follow his own nature and not that of another 
person. He ultimately concludes: id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque 
maxime suum (For what especially befits each person is that which is uniquely 
characteristic of himself, Off. 1.113). It is perhaps not unimportant that in this 
passage Cicero describes as an ethical disorder the violation of the properties that 
befit a specific personality.18  
In the first Philippic, it is clear to Cicero that every last one of his colleagues 
suffers from a moral and ethical lapse: each of them has forgotten himself and is 
no longer able consistently to keep up with the prerogatives of his role, acquired 
over many years of political activity. Thus, the first Philippic diagnoses as a loss of 
dignitas that which the de Officiis posits as a violation of decorum. 
17 On the relation between the two works, see Stone (2008). 
18 Picone (2008) 66–70. The author also offers a general interpretation of the de Officiis in 
Picone (2012) viii–xxxvi. 
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Cicero, however, intends to avoid the common malady: he has done so by 
choosing when and how to participate in sessions of the Senate, and then by 
undertaking the maintenance of the entire performative capability of his own 
voice and silence. In the present circumstance, having finished his exposition, 
Cicero is able to use his voice to “say what must be said”; the first act is to thank 
Piso, who, like himself, took note of the changed political conditions in which it 
was honorable to use speech not so much to change the situation as to define 
one’s own autonomy and to affirm one’s dignity: Qua re primum maximas gratias 
et ago et habeo Pisoni, qui non quid efficere posset in re publica cogitavit, sed quid facere 
ipse deberet (Wherefore, in the first place, I feel and I render great thanks to Lucius 
Piso, who was thinking not about what great thing he could accomplish in the 
republic but rather simply what his duty was, Phil. 1.15). The principle of justice 
that presses each person to do what he ought, without creating clear expectations 
for how well he might succeed, is, according to Cicero, closely joined to the Stoic 
proposition of doing good “in itself.” In so doing, one displays the best aspect of 
one’s character. Piso has done this, and Cicero intends to do so as well. Thus 
Cicero asks again, in accordance with a long-standing practice, the audience’s 
indulgence (Phil. 1.15). 
The moment of dicere quae dicenda sunt has finally arrived. In the name of 
peace, Cicero shows a degree of approval of the acts of Caesar—although these 
acts were already effectively rendered “legal” by the dictator. He also, however, 
declares that to gain approval one cannot use force and supersede the traditional 
procedure of enactment by popular consensus, appealing to a law that has never 
been written (Phil. 1.26–7): 
 
Quid tum? quod ita erit gestum, id lex erit? et in aes incidi iubebitis, 
credo, illa legitima: CONSULES POPULUM IURE 
ROGAVERUNT (hocine a maioribus accepimus ius rogandi?) 
POPULUSQUE IURE SCIVIT. Qui populus? isne qui exclusus 
est? Quo iure? an eo quod vi et armis omne sublatum est? Atque 
dico de futuris, quod est amicorum ante dicere ea quae vitari 
possint: quae si facta non erunt, refelletur oratio mea. Loquor de 
legibus promulgatis, de quibus est integrum vobis; demonstro vitia. 
Tollite! Denuntio vim, arma; removete!  
 
What then? Will that which will have been thus accomplished 
become law? And you will order, I trust, that those legal decrees be 
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engraved in bronze: “The consuls have duly consulted the 
people”—did we receive this way of consulting from our 
ancestors?—“and the people duly passed the law.” What people? Is 
it the people who were kept out? By what law? Can it be the law that 
has been wholly cast aside by violence and weapons? Moreover, I 
am speaking about the future, because it is the duty of friends to 
mention things that can still be avoided. Which, if they never 
happen, my speech will be justly refuted. I am speaking of laws that 
have been put forth, about which it is entirely yours to decide. I am 
pointing out their flaws: take them away! I am denouncing violence 
and weapons: get them out of here! 
 
The words of Cicero are directed toward the recovery of the community's 
memory of shared conventions and institutional practices. The act of speaking  
seeks to restore the proper sense to words, to prevent them from being used as 
empty shells that no longer correspond to reality. Moreover, Cicero’s voice 
proves to be intrinsically connected to the practice of admonition and is 
employed as a means of amicable intervention that warns of avoidable errors. 
The conveyance of such correction is certainly a desirable outcome, as it offers a 
preemptive warning that has achieved its goal, whereby the task of the genuine 
politician is fully realized.19  
Cicero’s speech thus becomes an authoritative denunciation: it is necessary to 
speak of those flaws that are before the eyes of all. Speech now begins to have a 
concrete function again, that of prescribing what must be done to restore the rule 
of law.20 Yet the speech that he makes is also one of deliverance; by the mere act 
of speaking, Cicero is able to promote the truth, and thus enhance, through the 
proper channels, an opportunity for Roman solidarity. He thus posits a specific 
dynamic that makes it difficult for anyone to show ire toward another 
interlocutor; in the present circumstance, as Cicero says to Dolabella, anger is 
not appropriate. Anger suits an offense, or to an act of aggression that damages 
19 For the reconstruction of such a code, albeit in the context of Plautine comedy, I refer to 
Raccanelli (1998).  
20 Cicero’s use of loquor (1.27) seems to reecho an ancient formulation of Lucilius, an eques as 
well as a satirical poet, in no way disposed to renounce the privilege of speaking about that which 
concerns him: mihi necesse est eloqui, / nam scio Amyclas tacendo periisse (I must needs speak out, for I 
know that Amyclae perished through keeping quiet, 696-7 Warmington). For these foundational 
aspects of the genre of satire, cf. Marchese (1998) 23–47.  
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someone’s integrity; it is certainly not the appropriate response to a speech that 
defends the state. 
Antony, however, is more closely connected with the current state of affairs 
than Dolabella (Phil. 1.27): 
 
Sed proponam ius, ut opinor, aequum, quod M. Antonium non 
arbitror repudiaturum. Ego, si quid in vitam eius aut in mores cum 
contumelia dixero, quo minus mihi inimicissimus sit non recusabo; 
sin consuetudinem meam … tenuero, id est si libere quae sentiam 
de re publica dixero, primum deprecor, ne irascatur; deinde, si hoc 
non impetro, peto ut sic irascatur ut civi.  
 
But I will propose a law, a fair one, as I see it; I think that Marcus 
Antonius will not reject it. If, to effect an insult, I will have spoken 
anything against his lifestyle or his character, I will not deny him the 
right to be most inimical toward me. But if I will have kept to my 
regular practice … , that is, if I will have freely spoken what I am 
thinking about the republic, first I beg that he not be angry, and then, 
if I fail to obtain that, I seek at least that he only be angry as befits a 
fellow citizen. 
 
An important question is introduced in this section of the speech. Antony has 
reacted to Cicero’s absence as being a rejoinder to a personal injury; yet Cicero 
explains clearly that he addresses a matter of public interest, unconnected to his 
personal relationship with Antony.  
Cicero’s absence sets forth a political question concerning whether or not he 
should deliver a speech. Seizing that opportunity, Cicero’s speech points up 
Antony’s impropriety, both with regard to Roman institutions and on the level of 
the divine. Cicero’s initial absence is therefore telling, but not because it suggests 
an affront, as Antony believes. Rather, Cicero’s absence reflects a defensive 
posture, meant to preserve the state. While it is possible for Antony to become 
angry with Cicero, the citizen who defends the res publica, can only do so in terms 
that befit one citizen becoming angry with another: words, not weapons, will 
wage such a war. Cicero’s own classification of such conflicts, posited in de Officiis 
(1.38), provides a context for his handling of Antony: 
 
Ut enim cum civi aliter contendimus, si est inimicus, aliter si 
competitor (cum altero certamen honoris et dignitatis est, cum 
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altero capitis et famae) sic cum Celtiberis, cum Cimbris bellum ut 
cum inimicis gerebatur, uter esset, non uter imperaret, cum Latinis, 
Sabinis, Samnitibus, Poenis, Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur. 
 
As with a fellow citizen we contend in one way if he is a personal 
enemy, we do so in another if he is a competitor (for with the one it 
is a struggle for office and dignity, with the other, it is a struggle for 
life and reputation). Just so, when we fight a battle with the 
Celtiberians and Cimbrians, our deadly enemies, we do so not to 
discover which should have the power to rule, but which should 
survive; but with the Latins, Sabines, Samnites, Carthaginians and 
Pyrrhus such struggles were about ruling.  
 
The distinction that Cicero presents here posits a certamen as a struggle outside of 
a community for political sovereignty. The other kind of struggle  governs 
interactions among citizens, who may compete among themselves to attain 
public offices and to earn social standing. For some citizens, the struggle can 
concern life itself and one’s reputation, and so becomes a matter of enmity. 
Between communities Cicero justifies a greater level of ferocity beyond mere 
political gambits, for those conflicts concern the survival of the people. 
When, at Phil. 1.27, Cicero states that he does not intend to commit an act of 
aggression against Antony, he brings the conflict back merely to the exercise of 
civic power. Cicero’s position pertains to proper conduct within the state; 
Antony’s, by contrast, is presented as a matter of bad faith. Antony deliberately 
misinterprets Cicero’s position as a personal attack; Cicero, by contrast, seeks to 
employ speech to establish a proper lexicon for defining the problem and 
analyzing behavior. Accordingly, Cicero’s speech takes on a didactic feel, as he 
explains the conduct of Dolabella and Antony as the fruit of misunderstanding 
that has led them to attribute value to the wrong things. If only in the wrong way, 
they nevertheless do move toward the existential horizon of a Roman citizen, the 
achievement of glory: te enim intuens, Dolabella, qui es mihi carissimus, non possum 
de utriusque vestrum errore reticere. Credo enim vos nobilis homines … caritatem 
civium et gloriam concupivisse (For when I look at you, Dolabella, who are so very 
dear to me, I cannot keep silence about the error of you both; for I believe that 
you both, noble men that you are … have been eager to acquire glory and the 
love of your fellow citizens, Phil. 1.29). The words of Cicero radically rewrite the 
intentions of the two politicians: on Cicero’s interpretation, it is not an 
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attachment to money and personal power that drives them, but the aspiration to 
lofty things that befits magnanimous people, who admittedly are able to err when 
they undertake unbecoming methods of self-promotion. For Dolabella and 
Antony, Cicero provides as correctives the evaluations offered in the de Officiis of 
the destructive effects of the greatness of spirit that is not tempered by self-
control. Nevertheless, Cicero subjects these correctives to additional revision: 
the admonition against mixing aspiration to greatness with the desire for wealth 
and power concludes with the positive instruction to aspire to the love of citizens 
as an authentic achievement of glory. Such a result comes from actions in the 
common interest, actions whose value is recognized by collective testimony, as 
the objective condition of glory is transformed into the subjective (and public) 
condition of praise.21 In fact, in de Officiis Cicero goes on to join magnanimity 
with justice, positing such a connection as an effective deterrent against self-
interested desire and action (Off. 1.62). 
As we have already seen, in de Officiis Cicero’s ideas on the healthy exercise of 
high-mindedness reveal a degree of austerity regarding public recognition of the 
value of action (Off. 1.66): 
 
Omnino fortis animus et magnus duabus rebus maxime cernitur, 
quarum una in rerum externarum despicientia ponitur…. Altera est 
res, ut, cum ita sis affectus animo, ut supra dixi, res geras magnas illas 
quidem et maxime utiles, sed et vehementer arduas plenasque 
laborum et periculorum cum vitae, tum multarum rerum, quae ad 
vitam pertinent. 
 
The soul that is altogether brave and great is especially marked by 
two distinctions: of these, one is the capacity to disregard external 
circumstances…. The second distinction is that, when you have 
been disciplined in your soul in the way I explained earlier, you do 
indeed perform great and useful tasks, and you also perform tasks 
that are arduous and laborious and dangerous not only for life but 
also for the many things that make up life. 
 
For Cicero, the best control over the aspiration to greatness is to be found in 
keeping one’s distance from extraneous factors. While such an attitude of disdain 
21 For this distinct classification, see Mazzoli (2004). An important semantic analysis can be 
found in Thomas (2002).  
 
 
                                                          
ROSA RITA MARCHESE 94 
can be seen in the refutation of wealth and honor, it is especially discernable in 
the propensity with which one is prepared to give up life and possessions. Cicero 
fine-tunes a system of exercises for anyone who aspires to greatness. That system 
is characterized by an ascetic emphasis on the renunciation of self and 
abandonment of earthly desires, including all material comfort and public 
recognition, even to the point of eschewing some paths to glory (Off. 1.68). 
In comparison with the proposition that makes a magnanimous man into an 
ascetic—one who returns his wealth to the city and knows how to step away 
from glory to preserve freedom and objective choice—the paraenetic instruction 
that Cicero offers to Dolabella and Antony in the first Philippic is clearly more 
delicate. In Phil. 1.29 cited earlier, we saw that the renunciation of the attainment 
of wealth and personal power gained through violence is set beside a positive 
model of upright action. The Roman people as a whole are described as capable 
of testifying to action that leads to genuine affection and glory.  
Cicero thus attempts to bind his interlocutors to their proper responsibilities. 
The exercise of power in a city that has emerged from fire and slaughter should 
compel them toward proper action on behalf of the community as a whole. On 
behalf of that community, Cicero had recently demonstrated gratitude to 
Antony, who, after restoring concordia and salus to a wounded city, suddenly had 
changed course (Phil. 1.33): 
 
Num te, cum haec pro salute rei publicae tanta gessisses, fortunae 
tuae, num amplitudinis, num claritatis, num gloriae paenitebat? 
Unde igitur subito tanta ista mutatio? Non possum adduci ut 
suspicer te pecunia captum. Licet quod cuique libet loquatur, 
credere non est necesse. Nihil enim umquam in te sordidum, nihil 
humile cognovi. Quamquam solent domestici depravare non 
numquam; sed novi firmitatem tuam. Atque utinam ut culpam, sic 
etiam suspicionem vitare potuisses!  
 
When you had done such great things to preserve the republic, 
certainly you were not bothered by your fortune, prestige, renown 
or the glory that had accrued to you? Whence, therefore, this 
striking volte-face? I cannot be led to suspect that you have been 
captivated by money. Anyone may say what he wants to, but it is not 
necessary to believe it. Truly, I never saw anything base or low-class 
in you. Although the members of one’s household do sometimes 
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corrupt him; but I know your firmness. And would that you could 
avoid blame, let alone all suspicion of it. 
 
In compelling Dolabella and Antony to adopt responsible behaviors toward the 
city, Cicero avoids calling too much attention to Antony’s capricious and 
undependable character. How should Cicero, then, explain the volatility of his 
conduct? Perhaps he could have simply dismissed Antony’s about-face as 
stemming from a lack of proper family role models. Yet, even if he had some hope 
for the constancy of Antony’s inner disposition, Cicero clearly shared what was 
likely also his audience’s wariness, intimating that Antony had already begun to 
reveal his lack of self-control.  
Cicero’s speech, therefore, through various twists and turns, redefines the 
nature of glory, thereby suggesting Antony might simply have fallen victim to a 
misunderstanding, to an error of evaluation about what it requires (Phil. 1.33): 
 
Illud magis vereor ne ignorans verum iter gloriae gloriosum putes 
plus te unum posse quam omnes et metui a civibus tuis quam diligi 
malis. Quod si ita putas, totam ignoras viam gloriae. Carum esse 
civem, bene de re publica mereri, laudari, coli, diligi gloriosum est; 
metui vero et in odio esse invidiosum, detestabile, imbecillum, 
caducum. 
 
I fear this the more, lest being ignorant of the true way of glory, that 
you be more glorious than all your fellow citizens put together, and 
lest you should prefer being feared by your fellow citizens to being 
esteemed by them. But if you think so, you are ignoring the path of 
glory. That a citizen is dear to his fellow citizens, that he deserves 
well of the republic, that he is praised, respected and esteemed is a 
thing of glory; but that he is feared and hated, is invidious, 
detestable, weak and frail. 
 
The true path toward glory is furrowed and paved by the love of the citizens, not 
by their fear. Cicero’s definition is pointedly explanatory: to obtain true glory, one 
must be a citizen toward whom others feel gratitude for acquired beneficial 
actions that are objects of respect and veneration. Diametrically opposed to this 
is the fear felt for one who exerts superiority through violence. Cicero shows that 
one who positions himself to be feared will ultimately become an object of 
hatred, thereby attaining only a fleeting form of power that has the ideological 
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features of tyranny.22 In his speech to Antony, Cicero is not able to ignore  gloria 
as an objective that cannot be fully renounced. The consonance that we have 
posited between the themes of de Officiis and those of the first Philippic is 
expressed through a new and contextualized meaning of glory: the only feasible 
curbing of the individual is not his withdrawal from material and useful things, 
but rather his seeking the love of the citizens as a guarantee of his high position 
and as a durable tool for the maintenance of his power.  
In these arguments, Cicero again puts forth the paraenetic functions accorded 
to speech in the Pro Marcello, confirming how dear the recovery of specific duties 
for the voice of the orator can be. Through his speech, the orator plays the role of 
a guide along the path toward the reorganization of political dynamics, 
suggesting behaviors useful for training anyone who might wield power. Cicero’s 
attempt to restore to eloquence its capacity to effect change reaches an apex 
shortly following Caesar’s assassination. Soon, however, that attempt gives way to 
the results of an evident change in political conduct, a change too radical to be 
ignored.23 The recovery of speech, we have seen, signifies for Cicero first that his 
exposition of the factual truth places him in open opposition to Antony, as does 
his act of speaking, whereby he says “the things that must be said” about the life of 
the state. Though Cicero’s speech seems to recover its lost capacity for effective 
action, it does so not because it succeeds in freely inserting itself into a political 
debate. Rather, it becomes the expression of an independent capacity for 
intervention turned toward redefining the proper bounds of ethical and political 
conduct.  
Though in this speech Cicero precisely defines for the powerful the true path 
to glory, at the same time he shows awareness of the difficulty that he has had in 
the present circumstances in using speech to bring about concrete action. 
Cicero’s doubt about his speechmaking’s continued paraenetic or exhortative 
potential is explicitly revealed in the concluding remarks that the orator reserves 
for discussion of true glory: Sed quid oratione te flectam? Si enim exitus C. Caesaris 
efficere non potest ut malis carus esse quam metui, nihil cuiusquam proficiet nec valebit 
oratio (But why should I bend you by my speech? For, if the death of Caesar 
cannot affect you, so that you may prefer to be dear (to your fellow citizens) to 
being feared by them, no speech of anyone will profit you at all, nor will it 
22 For a discussion of Antony’s tyrannical characteristics, see Stevenson (2008) and (2009). 
23 Further on the changing atmosphere, cf. Zanker (1988) and Smith (2005). 
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influence you , Phil. 1.35). We have now wandered well beyond the path opened 
by the Pro Marcello in which Cicero had expressed his doubt that his speech 
could bend opinion or have the strength to show that the appreciation of the 
people is most desirable. In the particular setting in which the state finds itself, 
while it laboriously attempts to understand how and in what terms the 
institutional machine ought to begin to function again, the persuasive power of 
speech is easily overcome by the didactic value of concrete experiences, which are 
offered as right and proper exempla for actions and behavior. That the true path 
to glory is the love held, not the fear harbored, by one’s fellow citizens, is amply 
demonstrated by Caesar’s death. If such a traumatic event should fail to produce 
an instructive experience for all those engaged in politics, how can speech hope to 
be able to have the same effect or be as persuasive? In short, what can speech 
hope to achieve in a context that is capable of being deaf to the outcries caused by 
the wounds that res publica had suffered (Phil. 1.38)? 
 
Cepi fructum, patres conscripti, reversionis meae, quoniam et ea dixi 
ut, quicumque casus consecutus esset, exstaret constantiae meae 
testimonium, et sum a vobis benigne ac diligenter auditus. Quae 
potestas si mihi saepius sine meo vestroque periculo fiet, utar; si 
minus, quantum potero, non tam mihi me quam rei publicae 
reservabo. Mihi fere satis est quod vixi, vel ad aetatem vel ad gloriam; 
huc si quid accesserit, non tam mihi quam vobis reique publicae 
accesserit. 
 
I have reaped, conscript fathers, the fruit of my return, since I have 
said even these things to establish them as an outstanding testimony 
to my consistency, whatever fate may attend me, and I have been 
heard out by you kindly and diligently. If this opportunity will occur 
for me more often without danger to you or myself, I shall take it. If 
not, as far as I will be able I shall hold myself back, not for myself but 
rather for the republic. The span that I have lived has been just about 
long enough for me, both in terms of my age and my glory. If 
anything else comes my way, it shall accrue not so much to myself as 
to you and to the republic. 
 
At the conclusion of this oration, through the topos of thanking his listeners, 
Cicero finds a way to restore to his speech the only available prerogative left. He 
may still obtain a final harvest from this Senate meeting: Cicero has one last 
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opportunity to testify to how much can be achieved through the consistency of 
one’s choices and behavior. 
The power of speech thus offers him the potential to report, declare and 
evaluate the facts that involve the state. While such power does not necessarily 
allow him to “accomplish” things with words or to transform intervention into a 
position shared by all, nonetheless the power of speech does seem to contribute 
decisively to the final self-definition that Cicero will present to his fellow citizens. 
He presents himself as a witness, one who uses speech to bring before the eyes of 
all the rule of law, along with its potential for violation, and to establish the real 
dynamic of political conduct and its more-or-less revealed objectives. The orator 
and senator no longer speaks to effect action but to give testimony in accordance 
with the prerogatives of a voice, the recognizable remnant of which seems to be 
the maintaining of a connection with the past and proclaiming the mastery one 
can have over one's own choices.24 
 
ROSA RITA MARCHESE 
Università degli Studi di Palermo, rosa.marchese@unipa.it 
24 Translated by Dan Hanchey, Jeff Hunt, and Alden Smith, with special thanks to Hannah 
Adams, Jeff Cross, Charmaine Dull, Thelma Mathews, Sarah Russell and Rachel Smith. 
 
                                                          
